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PERSPECTIVES ON BROWN: THE SOUTH
AFRICAN EXPERIENCE
PENELOPE E. ANDREWS*
It is no mistake that our Constitution uses the phrase "achievement of equality." The
tremendous indignity and political oppression that characterized the years of apartheid
was coupled with the systemic entrenchment of economic disadvantage for millions of
South Africans. The vast majority of this country's wealth remained then and remains
still, as a consequence of the entrenched disadvantage, in the hands of a minority ....
The use of the phrase 'achievement of equality' therefore recognizes that the creation of
democracy and equal treatment before the law are not enough to foster substantive
equality.1
INTRODUCTION
When Brown2 was decided in 1954, South Africa was in the
throes of apartheid governance. 3 The white minority government
was barely a decade old and very confident and secure about the
validity - legally and morally - of its laws and policies. In short,
the doctrine of racial supremacy was fairly well entrenched. 4 By the
end of the 1950s, the majority black population had been disen-
* Professor of Law, City University of New York, School of Law. LL.M. Colum-
bia, 1984, LL.B. Natal 1982, B.A. Natal 1980. The author wishes to thank the faculty
and students of New York Law School for the invitation to participate in this sympo-
sium. She also thanks the Professional Development Committee at CUNY Law School
for ongoing research support.
1. Minister of Finance & Anor v. Van Heerden, 2004 (3) AllSA 63 (CC) at para-
graph 73 (Opinion of Mokgoro).
2. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. The Nationalist Party came to victory in South Africa in 1948 with a policy of
commitment to racial segregation. Laws were enacted that expressly gave effect to the
purposes of racial distinction, subordination and discrimination. For example, the Pop-
ulation Registration Act classified the population according to race and ancestry. The
Group Areas Act was promulgated to segregate residential areas according to the vari-
ous racial categories and the Prohibition on Mixed Marriages Act forbade the inter-
marriage between white and black South Africans. Apartheid (meaning separateness)
was the official ideology of the government from 1948 until 1994 when South Africa
held its first democratic elections. See INT'L DEF. AND AID FUND FOR SOUTHERN AFR.,
APARTHEID: THE FACTS (1983); see also NIFEL WORDEN, THE MAKING OF MODERN SOUTH
AFRICA: CONQUEST, SEGREGATION AND APARTHEID (2000).
4. LEONARD THOMPSON, A HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA (3d ed. 2001); see also AL-
ISTER SPARKS, THE MIND OF SOUTH Africa (1990).
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franchised and widespread public opposition to apartheid effec-
tively stifled.5 In sharp contrast to legal developments in the
United States, where the possibilities of racial integration and racial
equality were at least surfacing, South Africa was moving in a differ-
ent direction. As one of South Africa's most prominent human
rights lawyers has commented:
While your lawyers were preparing Brown v. Topeka, we
took the opposite direction... In 1953, the apartheid re-
gime, which was in power from 1948 until 1994, imple-
mented the Bantu Education Act, legislation denying
African people in South Africa an education that would
enable them to become more than hewers of wood and
drawers of water.6
A decision like Brown in 1954 therefore appeared distant and
almost irrelevant. But despite the grim political reality of South Af-
rica in 1954, the symbolic meaning of Brown cannot be overstated.
Brown's significance, albeit symbolically for forty years, was tremen-
dously important as South Africans in the 1990s began to embark
on negotiations that would lead the country towards non-racialism
and democracy. 7 The rhetorical power of Brown, seen by many as
an unequivocal rejection of notions of racial superiority and racial
inferiority, provided succor to those in South Africa who believed
that a societal route towards racial equality was possible.8
This paper views the meaning of Brown as three-fold. First,
Brown represented the repudiation of racial discrimination on le-
gal or constitutional grounds. Second, it furnished a model of pub-
lic interest lawyering for South Africans who wanted to challenge
unjust laws in the courts.9 Third, Brown reiterated the importance
5. JOHN DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER (1978).
6. Alison Thompson & Elizabeth Omara-Otunnu, Lawyers Reflect on "Ties that
Bind,"South Africa, U.S., ADVANCE ON THE WEB (May 6, 2002), at http://www.advance.
uconn.edu/2002/020506/02050602.htm.
7. ALISTER SPARKS, TOMORROw Is ANOTHER COUNTRY: THE INSIDE STORY OF SOUTH
AFIRCA'S ROAD TO CHANGE (1995).
8. Thompson & Omara-Otunnu, supra note 6. "George Bizos, a leading human
rights lawyer.. . said the United States had a significant influence on the struggle in his
country: 'We as lawyers followed the example of many of your lawyers and what they
were doing, especially in the 1950s.'"
9. George Cooper, Public Interest Law - South African Style, 11 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 106 (1980).
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of non-discriminatory education in a democracy. In this paper I
examine the lessons of Brown for the South African struggle for ra-
cial equality, South Africa's constitutional transition and the signifi-
cance of Brown in pursuing the right to education in South Africa.
I conclude that although Brown was of tremendous symbolic value
to South Africans, the South African constitutional framework, ne-
gotiated in the early 1990's, reflected global human rights develop-
ments more substantially than it did the American civil rights
struggle. 10 This is demonstrated by the mandate of the South Afri-
can Constitution to consider international law1' and by the limited
references to Brown by the Constitutional Court1 2 in comparison to
the court's citation of international legal materials. 13 Brown's wan-
ing substantive influence may also be attributed to the different
path towards non-racialism taken by South Africans in contrast to
the civil rights struggle in the United States.' 4
10. Several reasons account for this, most notably the contested nature of the
gains of the civil rights movement in the U.S. For a thorough exploration of these
issues see, Michael Heise, Brown v. Board of Education, Footnote 11, and Multidis-
ciplinarity, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 279 (2005); see also Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARv. L. REV. 518 (1976).
11. The South African Constitution requires a court to consider international law
when interpreting the Constitution. S. AFR. CONST. § 39 (1) (b) (1996).
12. See, e.g., In re The School Education Bill of 1995, 1996 (4) BCLR 537 (CC);
Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC); S. v. Jordan
and Others 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC). It is worth noting that the Constitutional Court does
not cite Brown in many cases involving education and in none of the racial equality
cases.
13. See, e.g., S. v. Makwanyane and Another CCT, 1995 (3) SA 94 (CC); S. v. Baloyi
and Others 2000 (1) BCLR 86 (CC); Carmichele v. Minister of Safety and Security and
Another, 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC); Government of RSA and Others v. Grootboom and
Other, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC); Minister of Health and Others v. Treatment Action Cam-
paign and Other 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC).
14. For an interesting discussion on the divergences of strategy in the South Afri-
can struggle for racial equality as compared to the American civil rights movement see
Alan Wieder, Nonracialism as an Educational and World View: Lessons from South African
Teachers, 90 CORNELL L. REv 505 (2005). On a visit to South Africa in January 2005, I
raised with colleagues, during informal discussions, the question of Brown and its signif-
icance during the constitutional negotiations. The responses seemed to suggest that
the American civil rights movement might have been a significant backdrop against
which the constitutional negotiations occurred, but that neither Brown nor the civil
rights movement featured at all. Indeed, none of the prominent accounts of the nego-
tiations by the protagonists mention Brown. The accounts of Cyril Ramaphosa (chief
negotiator for the African National Congress, the governing party post-1994) and Roelf
Meyer (chief negotiator for the Nationalist Party, the party of apartheid) are outlined in
115720051
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I. LESSONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA
In 1990, after the release of President Nelson Mandela from
prison, and particularly in the years preceding the first democratic
elections in 1994, South Africa could cast a fresh eye, not just on
Brown and its progeny, but indeed the civil rights struggle of the
United States. 15 By 1990, the possibilities generated by Brown and
many of the impediments to Brown had been played out in this
country. Despite Brown's outlawing of racial segregation, the ten-
sions between defacto racial segregation and growing economic in-
equality reflect an incomplete social revolution. 16 Indeed, it has
been noted that "Brown has gained in reputation as a measure of
what law and society might be. 17
Despite impressive civil rights gains, not just for African-Ameri-
cans, but for other racial minorities and women as well, in some
respects the struggle for racial equality in the United States served
as a cautionary tale for South Africa. For even though the gains of
the civil rights movement are apparent fifty years later, there still
appears to be no national consensus about what a racially equitable
society should look like, and more importantly, the path to be cho-
sen.' 8 Some scholars have argued, for example, that there are still
too many Americans who appear not to be persuaded about the
THE POsT-APARTHEID CONSTITUTIONS: PERSPECTIVES ON SOUTH AFRICA'S BASIC LAw (Pe-
nelope E. Andrews & Stephen Ellmann eds., 2001). However, Ms. Faranaaz Veriava, a
lecturer in law at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, stated that in
the last few yeaers Brown has been referred to in "all the academic literature" that ana-
lyzes the education clause in the Constitution. What is most relied upon by these com-
mentators is the section of the judgment discussing the value of education. (Private
correspondence between the author and Ms. Veriava.)
15. Commencing in 1990, a significant number of American and other foreign
lawyers traveled to South Africa to consult with public interest lawyers there about
America's attempts at racial integration. See, e.g., UNIV. OF THE W. CAPE & AR. NAT'L
CONG., AFFIRIMATIVE ACTION IN A NEW SOUTH AFRICA: THE APARTHEID LEGACY AND COM-
PARATIVE INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE (1992); see also THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AF-
RICA FROM A GENDER PERSPECTIVE (Sandy Liebenberg ed., 1995).
16. See CHARLES J. OGLETREE, ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST
HALF-CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (2004).
17. Derrick Bell, The Real Lessons of a 'Magnificent Mirage', THE CHRONICLE REvIEW,
THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Apr. 2, 2004, at B10.
18. For a thoughtful exploration of the difficulties of race-based determinations
for benign purposes, see Frank I. Michelman, Reasonable Umbrage: Race and Constitutional
Antidiscrimnation Law in the United States and South Africa, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1378 (2004).
See also Linda Greene, Race in the Twenty-First Century: Equality Through Law?, in CRITICAL
[Vol. 49
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benefits of a society in which notions of racial superiority and inferi-
ority have been discarded. 19
South Africans also witnessed in the decades since Brown how
increasingly the struggle for racial equality has been hijacked at
both the philosophical/rhetorical level and the practical one.20 In-
deed, it is arguable that the very notion of equality has been
stripped of its intended purpose (redress for past injustice) 21 and
distorted to pursue aims which do not necessarily comport with
those of the earlier architects of the civil rights movement here. 22
This is most pronounced in the struggle around affirmative action
where in the final analysis, a divided Supreme Court has allowed
diversity to remain as the central rationale for the continuance of
affirmative action programs. 23
Indeed, a skeptical South African public witnessed the rather
rancorous battle around affirmative action in the United States and
competing claims of "victimhood" that sometimes formed the sub-
text of the conflict. 24 These unresolved tensions no doubt influ-
enced the decision to include affirmative action in the South Afri-
can Constitution and shield it from constitutional challenge. 25
Modeling the provision for affirmative action on that contained in
RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 292 (Kimberle Crenshaw
et al. eds. 1995).
19. ELLIOT COSE, THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS (1995); see also DERRICK BELL,
FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992).
20. See Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal Protection Doc-
trine and Discourse, 48 UCLA L. REv. 1075 (2001).
21. See Taunya Banks, Brown at 50: Reconstructing Brown's Promise, 44 WASHBURN
L.J. 31 (2005). In her article Professor Banks points out that education was used as a
vehicle to attack racial segregation laws. Civil rights lawyers also used Brown to strike
down other segregation laws.
22. Id. See also Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Colour Blind," in
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 257.
23. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
24. See generally THE AFFIRMATIVE ACrION DEBATE (George E. Curry ed. 1996); see
also STEPHEN CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY (1991); CHRISTO-
PHER EDLEY, NOT ALL BLACK AND WHITE: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND AMERICAN VALUES
(1996).
25. In Minister of Finance & Anor v. Van Heerden, 2004 (3) AllSA 63 (CC), the Con-
stitutional Court upheld section 9 (1) of the Bill of Rights (the affirmative action provi-
sion). The case involved a challenge to employer contributions to a pension fund that
attempted to equalize the pensions of senior members of parliament (mostly White)
and their junior counterparts (mostly Black). The parity provisions were instituted to
deal with the legacy of apartheid, in which most Black parliamentarians would inevita-
20051
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both the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination 26 and the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 27 the Bill of Rights
provides that: "Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of
all rights and freedoms. To promote the achievement of equality,
legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance per-
sons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimina-
tion may be taken."28
II. THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION AND EQUALITY
The South African Constitution centers equality as the primary
principle and states that, "everyone is equal before the law and has
the right to equal protection and benefit of the law."29 The Bill of
Rights outlaws both direct and indirect discrimination on several
grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, eth-
nic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, relig-
ion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.30 This section
bly end up as junior members of Parliament (since under apartheid they were denied
the right to vote and subsequent participation in government).
26. G.A. Res. 2106, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 47, U.N.Doc.A/6014
(1966) (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969). In Part 1, Art. 4, the Convention provides
that:
Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advance-
ment of certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such pro-
tection as may be necessary in order to ensure such groups or individuals
equal enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms
shall not be deemed racial discrimination, provided, however, that such
measures do not, as a consequence, lead to the maintenance of separate
rights for different racial groups and that they shall not be continued after
the objectives for which they were taken have been achieved.
27. G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N. Doc. A/
34/46 (1979) (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981). Article 4 (1) provides that:
Adoption by States Parties of temporary special measures aimed at acceler-
ating de facto equality between men and women shall not be considered
discrimination as defined in the present Convention, but shall in no way
entail as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate standards;
these measures shall be discontinued when the objectives of equality of op-
portunity and treatment have been achieved.
28. S. AFR. CONST. §2.
29. Id. § 9(1).
30. Id. § 9(3).
[Vol. 49
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also recognizes the interconnectedness of various forms of discrimi-
nation by proscribing discrimination on one or more grounds.31
The section on equality also sets out a two-part test for discrimi-
nation by stating that "[d]iscrimination on one or more of the
grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established that
the discrimination is fair."3 2 Once an individual or group of indi-
viduals falling within the outlawed grounds of discrimination allege
discrimination, there is a presumption that the discrimination is un-
fair and the burden therefore shifts to the discriminator to demon-
strate that the discrimination is not unfair. A fairly novel inclusion
in the Bill of Rights is the recognition of human dignity.3 3
The listing of socio-economic rights in the South African Con-
stitution is extensive. Included are environmental rights; the rights
of access to land, housing, health care services, food, water and so-
cial security rights. Also included are rights to education and chil-
dren's socio-economic rights.3 4 These rights are not available on
demand. What is required is that the state must take reasonable
legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to
achieve the progressive realization of each of these rights.3 5
In comparing South African and American constitutionalism,
there are two points worth noting: The first is the extensive listing
of rights in the South African Constitution, including both the
range of civil and political rights, as well as social, economic and
cultural rights. The U.S. Constitution is a much more abbreviated
document, excluding social, economic and cultural rights. The sec-
31. Id. See also § 9 (4). For a discussion of the impact of race and gender on South
African women, see Penelope E. Andrews, Striking the Rock: Confronting Gender Equality in
South Africa, 3 MICH. J. RACE & L. 307 (1998).
32. Id. § 9(5).
33. Id. § 10. This section states very clearly that "[e]veryone has inherent dignity
and the right to have their dignity respected and protected."
34. S. AFR. CoNsT. §§ 24-29.
35. Id. See, e.g., §25(5) (Property) ("The state must take reasonable legislative and
other measures, within its available resources which enable citizens to gain access to
land on an equitable basis."); § 26(2) (Housing) ("The state must take reasonable legis-
lative and other measures, within its available resources to achieve the progressive reali-
zation of this right."); § 27(2) (Health care, food, water and social security) ("The state
must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources to
achieve the progressive realization of each of these rights."); and § 29(1)(b) (Educa-
tion) ("Everyone has the right to further education, which the state, through reasona-
ble measures, must make progressive, available and accessible.")
20051
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ond point worth noting is the explicit promise of transformation
made in the South African Constitution, suggesting a total recon-
struction of the society. The Preamble to the Constitution sets out
in comprehensive terms the goals of the new non-racial democracy,
including the task of healing "the divisions of the past" and estab-
lishing "a society based on democratic values, social justice and fun-
damental human rights".3 6  In addition, the Constitution is
designed to "improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the
potential of each person."37 The South African Constitution there-
fore is designed to ensure that the status quo, racist and inequita-
ble, is fundamentally restructured.38 In so doing, its egalitarian
commitments arguably outstrip the possibilities raised by Brown,
and indeed the Constitution of the United States.
III. THE SOCIETY IN TRANSITION - TowARDs EQuALITy
As mentioned earlier in this essay, Brown's legacy, and its offi-
cial death knell for the policy of racial segregation, was of enor-
mous symbolic importance to those who opposed apartheid in
South Africa.39 The legal universe of non-discrimination and equal-
ity spawned by Brown, and thereafter the burgeoning of interna-
tional human rights principles, most importantly the Convention to
Eliminate Racial Discrimination ("CERD") was of great importance.
It has been argued that Brown and American civil rights laws had an
enormous impact on the development of international human
rights principles regarding racial discrimination, and in particularly
CERD. 40 CERD created the framework within which the South Afri-
can architects of the new non-racial legal order could shape an in-
36. S. AFR. CONST. pmbl.
37. Id.
38. For a thoughtful assessment of the transformative possibilities of the South
African Constitution see Karl E. Klare, Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism,
14 S. AIR. J. HUM. RTS. 146 (1998).
39. Parallels have sometimes been drawn between apartheid in South Africa and
Jim Crow in the United States. See GEORGE M. FREDERICKSON, WHITE SUPREMACY: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF AMERICAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY (1981); see also BLACK
AND WHITE IN SOUTHERN STATES: A STUDY OF THE RACE PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES
FROM A SOUTH AFRICAN POINT OF VIEW (Maurice S. Evans ed., 2001).
40. J. Richard Goldstone & Brian Ray, The International Legacy ofBrown v. Board of
Education, 35 McGEORGE L. REV. 105, 106 (2004).
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digenous view of equality to comport with South Africa's peculiar
legacy of racial subordination, dispossession and discrimination. 4 1
But what was this equality to look like? The South African Con-
stitutional Court in several judgments has outlined a version of
equality that eschews a merely formalistic one to that embracing a
substantive equality.4 2 The Court has restated its vision of substan-
tive equality in a series of cases. In the latest decision which vali-
dated the affirmative action provision in the Bill of Rights, 43 the
Court stated:
As we have seen a major constitutional object is the crea-
tion of a non-racial and non-sexist egalitarian society un-
derpinned by human dignity, the rule of law, a
democratic ethos and human rights. From there emerges
a conception of equality that goes beyond mere formal
equality and mere non-discrimination which requires
identical treatment, whatever the starting point or
impact.4 4
41. CERD provides a comprehensive definition of racial discrimination, much of
which became incorporated into the South African Bill of Rights. The definition in
Part 1, Article I of the South African Constitution provides that:
In this Convention, the term "racial discrimination" shall mean any distinc-
tion, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or
national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or
impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social,
cultural or any other field of public life.
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A. Res,
2106 A(XX), 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (1969), Dec. 21, 1965, available at www.unhchr.ch.
42. For example, in Fraser v. Naude and Another, 1998 (11) BCLR 1357 (CC), the
court struck down a statute which disposed of a father's consent for adoption of a child
born out of wedlock, while conversely requiring the consent of a father when the par-
ents are married. Similarly, in President of the Republic of South Africa v. Hugo, 1997 (6)
BCLR 708 (CC), the Court allowed a facially gender discriminatory presidential pardon
to stand where mothers of minor children would benefit. In a controversial decision,
the Court contextualized the role of mothers in child-bearing and child-rearing, and
concluded that a presidential pardon which benefited mothers in prison did not violate
the rights of fathers in similar situations.
43. Minister of Finance and Others v. Van Heerden, 2004 (11) BCLR 1125 (CC).
44. Id. 26. The Court continued, "This substantive notion of equality recognizes
that besides uneven race, class and gender attributes of our society, there are other
levels and forms of social differentiation and systematic under-privilege, which still per-
sist." Id. 27.
2005]
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In this respect one could argue that the Constitutional Court, com-
pared to the United States Supreme Court, appreciates that sub-
stantive equality is the engine that moves a racist society towards
one underpinned by non-racialism and democracy. 45
Brown's legacy was important in another respect for South Af-
rica. Brown catapulted the United States Supreme Court into a cen-
tral role in shaping the path towards racial equality - the Court
essentially usurped what had fundamentally been seen as a state
prerogative. 46 For South Africans emerging from the excesses of
the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, the Court as an arbiter of
government policy and law was a refreshing alternative. Indeed
during the days when apartheid's demise seemed far away, public
interest lawyers in South Africa were clearly inspired by the path
that public interest litigation had followed in this country.47 These
began in the various challenges to racial segregation pre-Brown, the
victory in Brown itself, and then subsequent public interest pursuits
by women, consumers, and other racial minorities. 48 South Africa's
Constitutional Court and its role in enforcing the values and princi-
ples of the Constitution bear testimony to this. 49
IV. BROWN AND THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION
Focusing specifically on education and Brown, the struggle in
the United States was about equal access to education, and specifi-
45. Indeed, the drafters of the Bill of Rights were clear about the purpose of the
Constitution, namely, to generate a transformative agenda with human rights at the
center. Chapter One of the Constitution lists several values on which the new South
African state is founded, including human dignity, the achievement of equality, and the
advancement of human rights and freedoms, non-racialism and non-sexism. S. AFR.
CONST. ch 1. § 1(a) & (b).
46. Goldstone & Ray, supra note 40, at 116. The authors opine that "Brown oper-
ates ... as a paradigmatic example of the power of courts to ... force social change.
47. Id.
48. For a thoughtful account of the ramifications of Brown, see ROBERT J. CoT-
TROL ET. AL., BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: CASTE, CULTURE, AND THE CONSTITUTION
(2003).
49. In Chapter 8, Section 167(5), the South African Constitution provides that:
The Constitutional Court makes the final decision whether an Act of Parlia-
ment, a provincial Act or conduct of the President is constitutional, and
must confirm any order of invalidity made by the Supreme Court of Appeal,
a High Court, or a court of similar status, before that order has any force.
[Vol. 49
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cally the right to an integrated education. 50 Other speakers in this
symposium have explored Brown's legacy, highlighting whether the
goals of Brown have been attained.
The South African Constitution in effect captures the essence
of Brown, but goes much further, providing a more comprehensive
definition of the right to education. The Bill of Rights provides
that "everyone has the right to a basic education, including adult
basic education. '5 1 It also provides that "everyone has the right to
further education, which the state, through reasonable measures,
must make progressively available and accessible. '52 Moreover, rec-
ognizing and catering to the multiplicity of languages spoken in the
country, the Bill of Rights also provides the right for South Africans
to "receive education in the official language or languages of their
choices" 53 at state schools "where such education is reasonably
practicable." 5 4
The Bill of Rights further provides that in implementing this
right, and making it accessible, the government "must consider all
reasonable educational alternatives '55 within considerations of "eq-
uity and practicability"56 and "the need to redress the results of past
racially discriminatory laws and practices." 57 The Bill of Rights also
provides for those who wish to pursue the establishment and main-
tenance of private schools, on the condition that such educational
institutions register with the government and "do not discriminate
on the basis of race."5 8 Moreover, these private educational institu-
tions are required to "maintain standards that are not inferior to
standards at comparable public educational institutions."59
This positive and negative component of the Bill of Rights was
put to the test in a case involving the constitutionality of several
50. Banks, supra note 21. "Thus, it is unsurprising that 'equal education' in a post
Brown world became synonymous with racially integrated schools." Id. at 40.
51. S. AwR. CONST. § 29(1)(A).
52. Id. § 29(1)(b).
53. Id. § 29(2).
54. Id
55. Id
56. Id.
57. S. AFR. CONST. § 29(2)
58. Id. § 29(3).
59. Id.
2005]
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sections of a provincial bill.60 One of the challenged sections was a
prohibition on the testing for language competence as a criteria for
admission to a public school. 6 1 Another dealt with the formulation
of public school policy on religion that explicitly aimed to foster the
development of a national democratic culture providing sufficient
recognition of South Africa's diverse cultural and religious tradi-
tions. 62 Another part of the challenged bill related to the rights of
students at public schools not to attend religious education classes
and their right not to participate in religious practices at that
school. 6 3
This case was brought under South Africa's Interim Constitu-
tion. 64 The petitioners contended that the clauses violated Section
32(c) of the Interim Constitution which provided that everyone has
the right "to establish, where practicable, educational institutions
based on a common culture, language or religion, provided that
60. 1996 (4) BCLR (CC).
61. Section 19(1) of the Bill provided as follows:
(1) Language competence testing shall not be used as an admission re-
quirement to a public school;
(2) Learners at public schools shall be encouraged to make use of the
range of official languages;
(3) No learner at a public school or a private school which receives a sub-
sidy . . . shall be punished for expressing himself or herself in a lan-
guage which is not a language of learning of the school concerned.
Id. 1 3.
62. Section 21 (2) of the challenged Bill provides that:
The religious policy of a public school shall be developed within the frame-
work of the following principles:
(a) The education process should aim at the development of a national,
democratic culture of respect for our country's diverse cultural and re-
ligious traditions.
(b) Freedom of conscience and religion shall be respected at all public
schools.
Id. 14.
63. Sections 22 (3) (a) (i) of the challenged Bill provides that:
Every learner at a public school, or at a private school which receives a
subsidy.., shall have the right not to sttend religious education classes at
the school.
Id.
64. The constitution writing process in South Africa involved two stages: The first
was the drafting of the Interim Constitution that laid out the structure of governance
for the first five years of the new democratic government. The Interim Constitution
outlined the process by which the Final Constitution was to be written. See Penelope
Andrews & Stephen Ellmann, Introduction: Towards Understanding South African Constitu-
tionalism, supra note 14, at 1.
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there shall be no discrimination on the ground of race."65 The pe-
titioners interpreted Section 32(c) as imposing a positive obligation
on the state to establish, where practicable, public schools based on
a common culture, language or religion.
The Court held that a proper reading of Section 32(c) did not
suggest a positive obligation on the state. 66 The language and pur-
pose of the section did not support such an interpretation. In the
Court's opinion, the section meant only that a person shall have the
right, in association with others, to establish educational institutions
based on a common culture, language or religion, where this is rea-
sonably practicable, and provided there is no discrimination on the
ground of race.67 The Court claimed that the challenged section
does not create an obligation on the state to establish such schools,
but rather protects the right of the individual to do so. The dis-
puted clauses of the Bill therefore did not conflict with Section
32(c). Citing Brown, the Court noted that:
Afrikaans ... like all languages, is not simply a means of
communication and instruction, but a central element of
community cohesion and identification for a distinct
community in South Africa. We are accordingly dealing
not merely with practical issues of pedagogy, but with in-
tangible factors, that as was said in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion of Topeka, form an important part of the educational
endeavor. In addition, what goes on in schools can have
direct implications for the cultural personality and devel-
opment of groups spreading far beyond the boundary
fences of the schools themselves. 68
The Court recognized the importance of identity and language, but
these factors were to be considered a negative right against state
intrusion, not a positive obligation on behalf of the state.
In 2000 the Constitutional Court had to consider another case
dealing with religion, namely, the right of independent (religious)
schools to impose corporal punishment when they deemed it appli-
65. Section 32 (c) of the Interim Constitution, Act 200 of 1993, is identical to
Section 29 (3) of the final Constitution.
66. 1996 (4) BCLR (CC) 1 9.
67. Id.
68. Id. 47 (citations omitted).
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cable. 69 The central issue in the case was whether legislation
prohibiting corporal punishment in all school interfered with the
constitutional rights of parents of children in independent
schools.70 The argument was that, in accordance with their relig-
ious convictions, parents had delegated to teachers the right to ap-
ply corporal punishment as a method of discipline. 71
The Minister of Education, in defending the statute, raised a
contrary perspective: that indeed it was the infliction of corporal
punishment that violated the constitutional rights of children to
equality, human dignity and security of the person - all provided
for in South Africa's Bill of Rights. 72 The Court had in a previous
case strongly criticized the "culture of authority which legitimated
the use of violence" and contradicted South Africa's constitutional
principles.73 The Minister argued in the alternative that if the pro-
hibition in fact limited the religious rights of parents, such limits
were constitutionally permissible. 74 A unanimous court held that
69. 2000 (4) SA 757 (CC).
70. The challenged statute was the South African Schools Act 84 of 1996, in partic-
ular section 10 which provided that:
(1) No person may administer corporal punishment at a school to a
learner.
(2) Any person who contravenes subsection (1) is guilty of an offence and
liable on conviction to a sentence which could be imposed for assault.
Id. 2.
71. Id. 5. Counsel for the parents cited several verses from the Bible which ap-
parently required that they use "corporal correction". They contended that "corporal
punishment is a vital aspect of Christian religion and that it is applied in the light of its
biblical context using biblical guidelines which impose responsibility on parents for the
training of their children". Id. 4.
72. Counsel for the Department of Education referred to the preamble to the
National Educational Policy Act which declared that "to facilitate the democratic trans-
formation of the national system of education into one which serves the needs and
interests of all people of South Africa and upholds their fundamental rights." Id. 9.
73. Id. 44. Citing an earlier judgment, the Court noted that:
The deliberate infliction of pain with a cane on a tender part of the body as
well as the institutionalized nature of the procedure involved an element of
cruelty in the system that sanctioned it. The activity is planned beforehand,
it is deliberate. Whether the person administering the strokes has a cruel
streak or not is beside the point . The juvenile is, indeed, treated as an
object and not a human being.
2000 (4) SA 757 (CC) 44, citing 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC).
74. Id. 8. Section 36 of the Constitution provides as follows:
(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of
general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable andjusti-
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indeed there had been a limitation on the constitutional rights of
the parents, but such limitation was justified.
The Court has not had occasion to consider the substance of
the right to education. Most of the cases, excluding the one men-
tioned above, raised questions not central to the content of the
right to education. For example, the Court has considered the con-
stitutionality of disallowing non-South African citizens permanent
employment in public schools 75 The Court has also considered the
implications and validity of government spending in education.7 6
The Court's analysis in other cases involving socio-economic rights
suggests that the Court will interpret socio-economic claims, includ-
ing the right to education, against the government on the basis of"reasonableness. 77
The provision of the right to education in the Constitution is
premised on the truism that education is fundamentally a precondi-
tion for the exercise of other rights. Moreover, the overarching
principle of the Constitution, the right to equality, has to be contex-
tualized in the social and historical context of South Africa and its
legacy of dispossession, discrimination and subordination. It is no
accident that the major protests against apartheid emerged from an
unequivocal rejection by students of the grotesquely unequal sys-
tem of education which typified the policies of the apartheid
government. 78
liable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality
and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including:
a. the nature of the right;
b. the importance of the purpose of the limitation;
c. the nature and extent of the limitation;
d. the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and
e. less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the
Constitution, no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights.
S. AFR. CONST § 36.
75. CCT2/97 (1997).
76. 2002 (3) SA 265 (CC).
77. See, e.g., 2000 (11) BCLR 1169.
78. In June 1976, students in the black township of Sowetojust outside ofJohan-
nesburg commenced a strike to protest the teaching of Afrikaans in schools - a compul-
sory requirement for matriculation. The rioting soon spread from Soweto to other
towns on the Witwatersrand, Pretoria, to Durban and Cape Town, and developed into
the largest outbreak of violence South Africa had experienced. The police used brutal
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V. BROWN AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF SocIo-ECONOMIC RIGHTS
In incorporating the right to education, the framers of the
Constitution recognized the interconnectedness of education and
other socio-economic rights, for example, housing or health. The
framers also appreciated that ultimately the Bill of Rights was to be
transformative at the core - and the incorporation of both the
panoply of civil and political rights as well as social, economic and
cultural rights gave effect to that transformative vision. 79 The Con-
stitutional Court has generated an equality jurisprudence that com-
ports with this vision, cognizant of the historical and contemporary
context within which their judgments are situated.
If one examines the decisions of the Court regarding the en-
forcement of socio-economic rights, these goals are evident. In two
significant cases, involving the right to housing and the right to
health, the Court has shown that these rights can bring meaningful
relief to the poorest South Africans.80
In 2000, the Constitutional Court had to consider the right to
housing as incorporated in Section 26 of the Bill of Rights.8 1 The
case concerned an application for temporary shelter brought by a
group of people, including children, who were brutally evicted
from private land on which they were squatting. The conditions
under which the community lived were deplorable. They had ac-
cess to one tap and no sanitation facilities. When the case was
heard it was widely regarded as an international test case on the
enforceability of social and economic rights.8 2 The Court affirmed
force to quell the riots and several students died in the protests. See ELSABE BRINK,
SOWETO 16JUNE 1976 (2001).
79. Klare, supra note 38, at 164.
80. See Albie Sachs, Social and Economic Rights: Can They be Made Justiciable? 53 SMU
L. REv. 1381 (2000).
81. Section 26 provides as follows:
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing.
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right.
(3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demol-
ished, without an order of court made after considering all the relevant
circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions.
S. AFR. CONST. § 26.
82. 2000 (11) BCLR 1169. See Craig Scott & Phillip Alston, Adjudicating Constitu-
tional Priorities in a Transnational Context: a Comment on Soobramoney 's Legacy and Groot-
boom's Promise, 16 S. ArR. J. HUM. RTs. 206, 211-12 (2000).
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that the government had a duty in terms of Section 26 of the Con-
stitution (the right to adequate housing) to adopt reasonable pol-
icy, legislative, and budgetary measures to provide relief for people
who have no access to land, have no roof over their heads, and are
living in intolerable conditions. The judgment also dealt in detail
with the implications of the children's socio-economic rights en-
shrined in Section 28 of the Bill of Rights. 83
In The Treatment Action case 84 the appeal to the Constitutional
Court was directed at reversing orders made in a high court against
the government because of perceived shortcomings in its response
to an aspect of the HJV/AIDS challenge. The court found that the
government had not reasonably addressed the need to reduce the
risk of HIV-positive mothers transmitting the disease to their babies
at birth. More specifically the finding was that the government had
acted unreasonably in refusing to make an antiretroviral drug
called nevirapine available in the public health sector where the
attending doctor considered it medically indicated and not setting
out a timeframe for a national program to prevent mother-to-child
transmission of HIV. The Court exercised its authority under the
Constitution to provide injunctive relief and ordered the govern-
ment to do so, citing Brown as influential authority.85
The socio-economic rights cases that have been heard by the
Constitutional Court indicate that the Court has struck an appropri-
ate balance between its role as the final arbiter of the rights in the
Constitution and the role of the legislature in making resource allo-
cation decisions, cognizant of available resources.
CONCLUSION
Brown appeared to signal to all sectors of American society that
the commitment to racial equality was worth pursuing. Rhetorically
it centered civil rights discourse; indeed the case came to be the
most consequential civil rights decision of the twentieth century.
83. Section 28 of the Constitution provides as follows:
28 (1) Every child has the right -
c. to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services
S. Ar. Const. § 28.
84. 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC).
85. Id. at 107.
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Fifty years later the promises of Brown and its inability to meet those
promises continue to be debated.86
South Africa's vehicle to racial equality, arguably more expan-
sive, appears more strident and unequivocal. This may be because
South Africa always had what may have been lacking in the United
States in 1954: a majority of the population, historically dis-
empowered and subordinated, clearly committed to the goal of ra-
cial equality. Although racial minorities, and specifically African-
Americans, spearheaded the move towards racial equality, there was
not a national consensus about the eradication of racial discrimina-
tion even though that goal became official federal policy. South
Africa also had the benefit of four decades of global human rights
activism, with extraordinarily huge numbers of human rights activ-
ists committed to the eradication of racism and apartheid. Indeed,
the demise of apartheid vindicated forty years of global human
rights activism. 87
In short, Brown was decided amidst American reluctance and
international ambivalence about the immorality of racism. This was
not the case in South Africa in 1994. The new non-racial constitu-
tion emerged in an environment shorn of national reluctance and
international ambivalence about the need to eradicate racism in all
its manifestations.
86. See, e.g., GREGORY S. JACOBS, GETrING AROUND BROWN DESEGREGATION, DEVEL-
OPMENT, AND THE COLUMBUS PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1998). See also GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN E.
EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDU-
CATION (1996); JAMES T. PATrERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDuCATiOr. A CIVIL RIGHTS
MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY (2001). Steve Kahanovitz, a lawyer at the Legal
Resources Center (LRC), a public interest law firm in Capetown, noted that Geoff
Budlender, a colleague at the LRC (counsel in both the Grootboom and TAC cases)
relied heavily on Brown when arguing for particular rememdies. (Private communica-
tion between the author and Mr. Kahanovitz.)
87. See Louis B. Sohn, RIGHTS IN CONFLICT: THE UNITED NATIONS & SOUTH AFRICA
(1994).
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